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Matsuo  Matsushita,  David Tarr and a World Bank referee for constructive  comments  on previous  drafts
and helpful  discussions.I.  Introduction
Starting in the late 1980s, an increasing  number of policymakers  and academics  began calling
for the development  of multilateral  disciplines  on anticompetitive  practices. The rationales  offered for
this included market access concerns  (a perception  that falling trade barriers must be complemented  by
antitrust measures  to ensure that foreign competition  materializes);  a perception  that without such
disciplines  it is impossible  to constrain the use of trade policies such as antidumping;  and a belief that
the exercise of market power by global multinationals  requires  a global  competition  code.  The issues
have been the subject  of international  discussions  for many years.  Competition  law and policy
disciplines  were on the agenda of the negotiations  to establish  an International  Trade Organization
(ITO) after the second World War.  As is well known, the ITO never came into being, and the General
Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  only took over the ITO provisions  on restrictive  business
practices  in a "best-endeavors"  clause (Art. XXIX GATT). Since  then developing  countries  have
pursued the topic in the UN context and the OECD has been dealing  with the issue for many years in
the context of its Competition  Law and Policy  Committee. These efforts have resulted in various
"codes of conduct," none of which is legally  enforceable.'
Prospects  for negotiations  on multilateral  disciplines  relating  to competition  policy recently
increased  with the decision  of the first Ministerial  meeting  of the World Trade Organization  (WTO) in
December 1996  to establish  a working  group on the topic. The working group has been given two
years to study issues  relevant to the interaction  between  trade and competition  policy. This paper
discusses  the desirability  and feasibility  of alternative  types of international  agreement  on trade-related
antitrust  principles (TRAPs)  for developing  countries. Section  II reviews  the major options. The
desirability  of these alternatives  is analyzed  in Section  III, using  three criteria: (i) the impact  on market
contestability;  (ii) the likely effect on the welfare  of developing  countries;  and (iii) the possible
See Davidow  (1981)  for a discussion  of developments  in the 1960s  and 1970s;  Lloyd  and Sampson  (1995)
provide  an overview  of the  various  multilateral  instruments  and  fora  that  have  addressed  competition  issues.
1implications  for the trading system. Section IV discusses  the feasibility  question. Section  V concludes.
To summarize,  the paper argues that from a developing  country  perspective  a TRAPs
agreement  should  be limited  to a ban on horizontal  restraints (price fixing, market sharing,
etc.)-including a ban on export cartels-and embody a set of procedural disciplines  to ensure
transparency;  initiate a process of replacing  antidumping  actions with domestic  competition  law
enforcement;  and strengthen  the competition-advocacy  and dispute  settlement  dimensions  of the WTO.
Developing  countries  potentially  have much to gain from such an agreement. Achieving  it may be
difficult,  however. The elimination  of exemptions  for export cartels, the abolition  of antidumping  and
the strengthening  of the WTO are all issues  that will confront opposition  by interest groups in
industrialized  countries. Consequently,  the competition "dossier"  may require not only efforts by
developing  countries  to oppose  proposals on TRAPs that are not in their interest, but also a need to
pursue cross-issue  linkages  and tradeoffs  to achieve  an agreement  that benefits  them.
H.  Options  for an Agreement  on TRAPs
Many options  have been identified  in the literature on how competition  law might be treated in the
WTO, ranging  from a global competition  code (harmonization)  to doing nothing  (competition  between
competition  regimes). What follows identifies  the major ones.
Option  1.  Minimum  Antitrust Standards
In 1993,  the so-called  Munich group of competition  law experts created  a Draft International  Antitrust
Code (Fikentscher  and Immenga, 1995). The establishment  of an International  Antitrust  Authority  is
envisaged,  which would have the task of enforcing  a set of common,  harmonized  antitrust rules in all
contracting  parties (through the offices  of national competition  authorities). It would  have the power to
request  domestic competition  authorities  to initiate an investigation  and to challenge  implementation  of
the Code before an International  Antitrust  Panel.  The rules proposed  are detailed, and include  per se
2prohibitions for specified horizontal and vertical restraints.2 They would have direct effect,  i.e., they
could be invoked by private parties before national courts.  The Code would be an Annex IV
agreement under the WTO,  i.e., a plurilateral treaty applying only to those WTO members that sign it. 3
Scherer (1995) has made a proposal along similar lines, suggesting that agreement be sought on
a number of minimum standards:  "the most likely candidates are export and import cartels, serious
abuses of dominant positions in the world market,  and merger approval procedures"  (Scherer,  1996, p.
18).  An International Competition Office would start enforcing the agreed standards seven years after
its creation, and employ national competition authorities to support its investigations.  Participants
initially would be allowed to exempt three industries from the ban on export cartels.  A difference with
the Munich proposal is that the focus is much more on anticompetitive practices that directly affect
trade.
An EU Group of Experts has suggested that agreement be sought in the WTO context on
specific business practices that impede trade, without creating a new international institution (EU
Commission,  1995).  Enforcement of the common minimum standards would be the responsibility of
national antitrust authorities.  The agreement again would be plurilateral in nature.  In addition to the
substantive rules-per  se prohibitions on horizontal restraints and export cartels; complemented by a
rule of reason approach to other practices--the proposal includes notification requirements, positive and
negative comity obligations,4 and subjecting firms that have been granted special or exclusive privileges
to the agreed competition standards.  The WTO would enforce the agreement;  nullification and
2  The desirability  of alternative  competition  standards  are discussed  in Section  III below.
3  See Hoekman  and Kostecki  (1995)  for a discussion  of such agreements.
4 The notion  of positive  comity  appeared  alongside  traditional  negative  comity  in the September  1991  cooperation
agreement  in antitrust  between  the EU and the Unite  States. According  to the traditional  (negative)  comity  principle,
sovereign  states  will consider  important  interests  of other sates when  exercising  their own  jurisdiction.  Positive  comity
shifts  the initiative  to the state  whose  interests  are affected,  which  is given the legal  option  of requesting  another  state
to initiate  appropriate  enforcement  proceedings  to address  the petitioning  country's  concerns  (Art.V  of the agreement).
See Ham (1993) for a discussion  of the EU-US  agreement.
3impairment  provisions  would be extended  to private anticompetitive  practices. Others have made
suggestions  along similar lines, but are less ambitious  with respect to the coverage of the minimum
standards. For example, Messerlin (1996)  has suggested  that attention  be limited  to a prohibition  of
pro-cartel provisions  of national  competition  laws (i.e., export and import cartels). In all these cases the
TRAPs agreement  would also address  procedural and administrative  matters to ensure transparency,
enforcement,  appeal, and dispute  settlement.
Option 2.  Link Competition  and WTO Trade  Policy  Disciplines
A number of suggestions  have been made to introduce  competition  law principles into the WTO by
incorporating  them into specific  WTO Agreements. By far the most common proposal is to establish
linkages  between competition  law disciplines  and "unfair-trade"  laws such as antidumping. The most
far-reaching  suggestion  is to replace antidumping  with antitrust. 5 Less radical options include  allowing
antidumping  actions to be contested  (ex ante or ex post) on the basis of antitrust considerations;  making
an antidumping  investigation  conditional  upon a finding  by the antitrust authorities  of the home  market
of the exporting firms claimed  to be dumping  that they benefit from significant  barriers to entry; or
introducing  competition  law-type  thresholds  and criteria into the antidumping  process. Examples  of the
latter include  using a "relevant  market" instead  of "like product" approach to defining  the product
market in an investigation;  including  an injury to competition  standard; allowing  for competition-based
defenses  by exporters  (e.g.,  "meeting  the competition"  or absence  of market power); imposing
maximum  market share or concentration  criteria on domestic industries  that petition  for protection;  and
abolishing  provisions allowing  for suspension  of antidumping  investigations  after negotiation  of
voluntary  price "undertakings".6
Some antitrust-related  disciplines  have already been incorporated  into WTO agreements  on
5 Arguments  favoring  the  abolition  of antidumping  have  been  made  for many  years. See,  e.g., Caine  (1981).
6 See  e.g., Wood  (1989,  1996);  Messerlin  (1994,  1996);  Sch6ne  (1996);  Hoekman  and Mavroidis  (1996).
4trade policy. An example  is the Agreements  on Safeguards  (Art. XIX GATT). Art. 11 of the
Safeguards  Agreement  prohibits the use of voluntary  export  restrictions  (VERs)  and similar measures
on either exports or imports, including import  surveillance  and compulsory  import cartels.  WTO
members are also to refrain from encouraging  or supporting  the use of measures  with equivalent  effect
by public or private enterprises (Art. 11:3).
Option 3.  Extend the Reach of WTO "Nonviolation 'Dispute  Settlement Mechanisms
Some observers  have suggested  extending  the reach of WTO dispute  settlement  procedures  to cover
entry-restricting  business  practices that are tolerated  by a government. This approach would not
involve the negotiation  of substantive  antitrust  disciplines  (as under option 1); instead WTO dispute
settlement  panels would determine if business  practices restrict market access for foreign products.
Art. XXIII:  1 of the GATT already allows WTO members  to challenge  actions  by governments  that,
although  not illegal under WTO rules, nullify  or impair concessions  obtained in trade negotiations  (so-
called  non-violation  disputes). Until a dispute  between  Kodak  and Fuji was brought to the WTO in
1995, the provision  had not been used to challenge  non-enforcement  of antitrust law. 7 In part this
reflects a need to show that the nullification  is caused  by a government  measure that was not
"reasonably"  foreseeable  at the time the trade concessions  were negotiated. In the antitrust context  the
problem is whether  nonenforcement  or the discriminatory  application  of competition  law constitutes  a
"measure."
Use of nonviolation  dispute  settlement  might be facilitated  by seeking  agreement  that non-
enforcement  of national antitrust law is a government  "measure" and to weaken  the "reasonable
expectations"  language (Hindley, 1996). Explicit  agreement  on the necessary  conditions  for antitrust-
7 In 1982  the  EC requested  the  establishment  of a working  party  under  Art. XXIII:2  on  the basis  that  the  benefits
of successive  negotiations  with  Japan  were  not  realized  because  of "a series  of factors  peculiar  to Japan'  that  inhibited
imports. This  was a so-called  situation  complaint  under  Art. XXIII:  l(c), but was ultimately  never  pursued  (see
Bronckers,  1985;  WTO,  1995,  p. 670).
5related  nonviolation  cases could be sought. For example, it might  be agreed that the national antitrust
authority  must have ruled against a petition  by a foreign firm alleging  violation  of the antitrust law by
domestic  incumbents. Thus, if a foreign firm's petition is rejected  by the national  competition
authorities,  this would constitute  a "measure." 8 Alternatively,  Graham and Richardson  (1994) have
suggested  that in the case of antitrust-related  trade disputes  the application  of domestic  competition
legislation  first be reviewed  by a multilateral  panel of experts,  and that invocation  of nonviolation
proceedings  be made conditional  upon the panel finding  that national  competition  laws were not
appropriately  applied. Hoekman  and Mavroidis (1994)  argue in favor of a broader approach that
would focus on obtaining  agreement  that the effect of national  antitrust  be "contestable." This would
permit not only  invocation  of nonviolation  disputes  based on specific  antitrust  decisions  but would also
allow the effect of exemptions  to be contested.
Option 4.  Create a Competition Advocacy  Role for  the WTO
Rather than expand  the scope of WTO disciplines  to competition  law-related  issues, the WTO
secretariat  could be given a greater competition  advocacy role. In national  jurisdictions  there is a very
good case for allowing  competition  agencies to monitor  the competitive  impact  of government  policies
as well as enforce competition  laws (Khemani  and Dutz, 1995).  A number  of developing  countries and
economies  in transition  have granted their competition  agencies  the right to comment  on or oppose
government  policies that restrict competition  (Boner, 1995).9 A similar  task could be given to the
WTO.  One forum for this could be the WTO's Trade Policy Review  Mechanism,  under which the
trade policy stance of all WTO members  is periodically  subjected  to a detailed  report by the WTO
' This  has  been  suggested  by Mitsuo  Matsushita.
9  The  motivation  for this  is that  in economies  that  have  a history  of  intervention  and  where  industry  is often  highly
concentrated  enforcement  of competition  law will  need  to be supplemented  by competition  policies that  support  the
objectives  of the  competition  law. In addition,  there  will  often  be a need  for "educating"  enterprises,  legislators  and
officials  regarding  the  objectives  and  application  of competition  legislation.
6secretariat  which is the basis for a review by the WTO Council. Such reports could  be broadened  to
include not just trade-related  policies that are subject to WTO disciplines  but competition  policy broadly
defined. An alternative  is to give the WTO secretariat  a mandate  to undertake research  on the
competitive  effects  of government  policies in specific  areas.  An example  is to look at the economic
impact  of existing  product standards  and certification  requirements  on the contestability  of markets.
Another would  be an in-depth  investigation  of the behavior of state-trading  entities  and firms granted
exclusive  rights.
Option 5.  Weep  TRAPs Completely Off the WTO Agenda
A final option is not to do anything  at all in the WTO context. Some have argued that efforts should  be
devoted  to expanding  the reach and depth of bilateral and plurilateral  cooperation  between  the
competition  agencies  of the major industrialized  countries, including  application  of the principle  of
positive comity. The presumption  is that in the WTO setting priority should be given to more
"traditional"  government  policies  that discriminate  against foreign  producers, including  not only trade
barriers but also investment  restrictions,  government  procurement  practices  and policies  that reduce
competition  in service markets. The basic argument is that trade and investment  liberalization-while
perhaps not sufficient  to ensure competition-is the most powerful pro-competitive  instrument  available
and that as long as significant  trade barriers remain in place, the pursuit of antitrust  is a second-best
endeavor (Blackhurst,  1991;  Palmeter, 1994). It has also been argued that existing  WTO rules already
provide substantial  scope to contest  foreign actions that restrict competition  and that these should  be
"tested" before embarking  on further expansion  of the WTO agenda. Hoekman  and Mavroidis  (1994)
have noted  that the absence of antitrust-related nonviolation  cases may imply  that anticompetitive
practices  are not much of an issue.'° One can also point to the GATT ban on export quotas (Art. XI
1o  In an empirical  evaluation  of US Section  301  cases,  Finger  and Fung  (1994)  conclude  that  antitrust  violations
have  not  been  a factor  underlying  the initiation  of such  cases.
7GATT). This could in principle  be used to attack  export cartels, as these may well operate in a manner
that is analogous  to an export quota. If so, this would allow a violation  case to be brought.
III.  Developing  Country Interests
Three criteria are useful in evaluating  the desirability  of these options:  (i) the extent to which they
enhance the contestability  of markets for foreign firms; (ii) the likely impact  of alternative  options  on
the national economic  welfare; and (iii) their effect on the functioning  and integrity  of the existing
trading system."' The market access  yardstick is relevant  because to a large extent what is driving
antitrust on to the WTO agenda is a perception  that inadequate  antitrust enforcement  may allow
incumbent  firms to block or attenuate  foreign  competition.  Clearly the trade negotiators'  focus  on
market access is not necessarily  welfare improving,  given its emphasis  on mercantilist  and reciprocity
considerations.' 2
Market Access
To what extent could each TRAPs option  help increase the contestability  of markets  for foreign  firmns?
A minimum  standards  agreement  is not likely to do much to enhance the contestability  of markets for
foreign  firms.  In markets  where minimum  standards  imply a strengthening  of antitrust  law enforcement
(mostly  developing  economies),  the magnitude  of government-imposed  trade and investment  restrictions
often continues  to be significant. Agreement  on minimum  antitrust standards  per se may not have
much of an impact  on the conditions  of competition  for foreign firms if more traditional  trade and
investment  barriers are not reduced first.  Conversely,  in industrialized  country  markets  minimum
standards will be of little relevance  to developing  country  exporters as they are already satisfied.
" It is assumed  in the  subsequent  discussion  that  and agreement  will  be enforced  by national  authorities.  The
creation  of an international  antitrust  office  in the foreseeable  future  is generally  considered  to be utopian.
12  Indeed,  it may  be inconsistent  with  antitrust  principles  insofar  as negotiations  may  give  rise  to anti-competitive
market  sharing  and "voluntary"  import  expansion  agreements.
8Table 1: Antidumping  Investigations  and Measures  In Force, 1994-95
Country  Number  of initiations  during  Measures  in  Number  of initiations  during  Measures in
7/94-6/95  against:  force as of  7/95-6/96  against:  force as of
6/95  6/96
LMICs  HICs  LMICs  HICs
Argentina  5  1  3  26  16  28
Australia  3  3  86  6  2  86
Brazil  9  3  18  1  0  20
Canada  1  8  91  3  3  96
Chile  2  0  2  2  2  0
Colombia  1  0  6  5  0  7
EU  31  6  178  16  3  76
Guatemala  na  na  na  1  0  na
India  8  1  5  3  2  8
Israel  na  na  na  0  4  na
Japan  0  0  2  0  0  3
Korea  3  0  6  1  6  9
Malaysia  na  na  na  0  0  0
Mexico  18  0  42  2  1  61
New  Zealand  8  1  22  7  2  26
Peru  4  0  na  4  0  2
Philippines  2  1  na  0  0  na
Singapore  2  0  0  0  0  2
South  Africa  7  2  15  8  7  15
Thailand  0  0  1  0  0  1
Turkey  2  0  38  0  0  38
U.S.  21  9  305  10  6  294
Venezuela  1  0  na  5  0  4
TOTAL  128  35  820  100  54  776
Note: HIC=high income  countries;  LMICs=  low and middle  income  countries,  including  transition  economies
Source: 1995:Finger  and Winters  (1996); 1996:  WTO (1996).  Data are from reports  to the WTO  by member  countries.
9Introducing  more competition  law principles into existing  WTO rules could  have an impact  on
market access  if this were to constrain  the use of contingent  protection. Unfair-trade  laws and
associated  contingent  protection  have become a major consideration  for developing  country firms.  As
of mid-1996,  WTO members  maintained  776 antidumping  measures-either antidumping  duties or price
undertakings  by affected  exporters (Table 1).  Of these, 72 percent were imposed  by high income
countries,  the rest by developing  countries. Of the new investigations  launched  between  July 1994 and
June 1996 (a total of 317), over two-thirds  were directed  against firms from developing  countries. As
the Uruguay  Round agreements  to eliminate  the Multifibre  Arrangement  are implemented,  the
probability  of developing  countries  confronting  antidumping  may rise further.
Eliminating  the threat of antidumping actions would be of great benefit in terns  of
guaranteeing  market access  conditions  for exporters and reducing  uncertainty.  Even though high
income  countries account  for the lion's share of antidumping  cases, some 15 low and middle income
countries  also initiated  antidumping  investigations  in 1994-95  (Table 1).  An increasing  number  of
developing  countries  and economies  in transition either have or are in the process of adopting  unfair-
trade laws. At last count, over 50 developing and transition  economies  had antidumping  legislation
(WTO, 1996).13  Developing country trade accounted for some 32 percent of global trade in 1993: 20
percent of all merchandise exports involved sales of goods by industrial to developing economies;
South-South trade represented another  13 percent of the total  (World Bank,  1996).  Disciplining the
use of antidumping would improve access conditions in both industrial and developing country markets.
The option of expanding the reach of WTO nonviolation dispute settlement would facilitate
raising antitrust-related issues in the WTO and generate  inforrmation  on what types of practices are
13 The following  developing  country  and transition  economy  WTO  members  have  notified  antidumping  legislation
to the WTO: Argentina,  Barbados,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil,  Brunei  Darussalam,  Chile, Colombia,  Costa  Rica, Cote
d'lvoire, Cuba, Czech  Republic,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Republic  of Guinea,
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Macau, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, St. Lucia,
Senegal,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  South  Africa,  Sri Lanka, Suriname,  Swaziland,  Thailand,  Trinidad  & Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda,  Uruguay, Venezuela,  and Zambia.
10considered  most problematical.  However, the remedies  that may be suggested  by a WTO panel cannot
affect the national  application  of antitrust law-at  best a complainant  country  will  be offered
compensation. This is therefore  unlikely  to enhance market access conditions  for the firm that brought
the complaint. That is, the conditions  of competition  for firms will not necessarily  improve  as the
policies-by  definition-do not violate  any WTO rule.
Welfare
From a national  welfare  perspective,  in principle there is a strong rationale  for adopting  and enforcing
antitrust rules.  T'he  reason is that although  an open trade and investment  regime is a powerful  device to
ensure competition,  it may not be adequate  in the face of concerted  efforts by firms to collude  or to
restrict entry.  Moreover, if non-tradable  sectors (e.g., distribution  services)  are controlled  by domestic
manufacturers  and sheltered  from foreign competition  (through investment)  imports  may be subject  to
discrimination. Whether antitrust enforcement  will improve national  welfare depends  on the
substantive  rules that are adopted  and on their enforcement.  As in any area of regulation,  care must be
taken that the specific  disciplines  that are adopted are appropriate  to the economic  situation  of each
country and that competition  agencies  are shielded  from problems of capture and political  influence. 
14
The basic competition  norms that are considered for inclusion  in a TRAPs  agreement  are
therefore of great importance. Clearly "one size fits all" does not apply. This is amply illustrated  by
the widely  diverging  laws and policies among  OECD countries, where differences  exist on virtually  all
aspects  of competition  law, be it the treatment of mergers, resale price maintenance,  parallel imports,
the weights that should  be given  to actual versus potential  competition,  what constitutes  an abuse of a
dominant  position, and so forth.  This reflects differences  in objectives,  priorities, and economic
14 See, e.g., the  contributions  in McChesney  and  Shughart  (1995).
11philosophy." 5 A reading of the literature suggests  that there is virtual unanimous  agreement  that
horizontal  restraints-collusion between  firms in the same industry to restrict output  or fix prices-are
anticompetitive  and should be banned  (assuming  that the objective  of competition  law is to foster
efficiency). A multilateral  rule to this effect would benefit developing  countries.
With respect to most other practices  that may be of concern (e.g. vertical restraints,  actions  by
dominant firms, and mergers),  apparent restrictions  on competition  may be justified on efficiency
grounds.6 Most laws therefore allow  competition  agencies  to make  judgements in such cases
following  a so-called "rule of reason" approach. This suggests  that going beyond the adoption  of
common  norms on horizontal  restraints  is likely  to be very difficult, if not impossible. An implication
of the differences that exist across  high income  countries  on substantive  issues  is that the question
whether there exists a minimum  set of common  rules on "non-horizontal"  practices  that would benefit
developing  countries is not likely to be relevant  in practice. Instead, the focus of multilateral  attention
can be expected  to center on the procedural and administrative  aspects  of competition  laws in order to
ensure transparency  and due process.
Thus, at most any minimum  standards  are likely to be limited to horizontal  restraints.  There are
two types of such restraints  that are relevant. The first are domestic  restraints that impact  on the
domestic  market; another are restraints  imposed  by foreign  firms. The latter, which are exemplified  by
export cartels, are often explicitly  allowed  by national  competition  laws as long as the agreements  do
not have a detrimental  effect on the home country  market.  The Webb-Pomerene  Act in the US is a
prominent  example. Export cartels may allow firms to exploit  greater market power in foreign
markets. The resulting  transfer of income  (profits)  to domestic firms may increase the welfare  of the
home country, explaining  the permissive  attitude  that is often taken by national  competition  laws.
'5  For much  more  comprehensive  discussions  on  this topic,  see Boner  and  Krueger  (1992),  Boner  (1995),  and
Khemani  and Dutz  (1995).
16 See, e.g., Tirole  (1988),  Carlton  and  Perloff  (1994),  Viscusi  et al. (1995),  Khemani  and  Dutz  (1995).
12Although scope to exploit export cartels may exist for some developing  countries, they are more likely
to be confronted  with export cartels from industrialized  countries  that raise the price of imported  goods.
Indeed, developing countries  have traditionally  been concerned  about the scope for multinational
enterprises  to exploit their market power in developing  country  markets. A negotiated  ban on export
cartels would be beneficial  to developing  countries."
From a welfare perspective,  the procedural  disciplines  that are embodied  in a TRAPs
agreement  may well be a much more important  source of gain than the substantive  disciplines  that
nations commit  themselves  to.  Any agreement  is likely to be similar to existing  WTO agreements  on
issues  such as product standards, government  procurement  or intellectual  property. These agreements
have a few key substantive  provisions  (e.g., non-discrimination;  20 year patent protection)  which are
complemented  by very detailed procedural and "due process" requirements  that are intended  to ensure
that policies are transparent and the key rules are not easily circumvented. Any competition  agency
should  ideally have a number of features, including  transparency  of the administrative  mechanisms,
regulations  and procedures; separation  of investigation  and prosecution  from adjudication  functions;
expeditious  and transparent proceedings  that safeguard  sensitive  business  information;  provisions  for
imposing  significant  penalties; and checks  and balances  to guarantee  due process, including  the right of
appeal, reviews of decisions, and access to information  on legal and economic  interpretations
(Khemani, 1994). A TRAPs agreement  embodying  such principles  would help ensure that these
desirable features are realized in all WTO members, in part by providing  external  surveillance  of their
implementation.
The option  of linking  trade and competition  policy disciplines  is likely to be welfare enhancing
17 Of  course,  in principle  certain  developing  countries  may  have  some  (potential)  market  power  in the  export  of
particular  commodities.  However,  experience  with  commodity  agreements  illustrates  the  difficulty  of exercising  this.
More  generally,  the  pursuit  of "strategic'  trade  policies-of  which  toleration  of export  cartels  is an example-requires
a great  deal  of information  if it is to be welfare  enhancing,  and  account  must  be taken  of possible  retaliation  by trading
partners.  The  potential  gains  for developing  countries  that  might  be realized  through  export  cartels  are  likely  to be
much  lower  than  the  possible  cost incurred  through  the  activities  of foreign  export  cartels.
13for developing  countries  insofar as it reduces the threat of contingent  protection,  both in export markets
and at home. As mentioned  previously, an increasing  number of developing  countries  have adopted-or
are in the process of doing so-antidumping mechanisms. Thus, elimination  or disciplining  of
antidumping  is not only an issue of expanding  exports, but also one of reducing costs for domestic
users of imports  in developing  countries. It is well established  that the economic  rationale  for
antidumping  is almost nonexistent  and that antidumping  regimes  can be very costly  for the countries
that implement  them (Finger, 1993).
The welfare  implications  of expansion  of nonviolation  dispute  settlement  are also likely to be
positive as this is an additional  instrument  to ensure that liberalization  commnitments  will be
implemented. An important  advantage  of this option  over others is that it goes beyond competition
law-related  issues. In principle, any measure that nullifies a trade liberalization  commitment  can be
contested. Here again there is a domestic and foreign market access component,  with the former being
as if not more important  than the latter. The reason is that nonviolation  can be a useful avenue to
identify  policies  that restrict competition. In this respect nonviolation  is a "strong" form of competition
advocacy  and would complement  any mandate  that might be given  to the WTO secretariat to act as a
competition  advocate.
Giving the WTO such an advocacy  mandate would  also be beneficial  as it would generate
information  on the economic  effects of government  policies. More important,  it could  provide
incentives  for the establishment  of domestic  counterpart  institutions. The latter is particularly important
for developing  countries. Domestic "transparency  institutions"  and competition  agencies  have long
been promoted  by trade policy and competition  analysts  who argue that public information  on the costs
and benefits  of government  policies is required in order to countervail  rent-seeking  activities  (see e.g.,
Finger, 1982). A multilateral  competition  advocacy role may help to support  the creation  and
14operations  of such institutions.' 8
Systemic implications
From a trading system  perspective  a key question  is why an international  agreement  is necessary  to
achieve a particular outcome. In general, multilateral cooperation  is based on the existence  of
externalities  or "market failures" that result in outcomes  that are inefficient-that  is, there are gains
from cooperation. Of the various options, there seems to be least need for multilateral  cooperation  on
minimum  antitrust standards. After all, if it is in the self-interest  of countries  to prohibit  horizontal
restraints  on competition  one can expect them to pass legislation  to that effect. Many developing
countries have already done so (Table 2).  One rationale  for a minimum  standards  agreement  may be
that it will help encourage  countries that have not adopted competition  legislation  to do so."' A more
compelling  rationale  relates to the procedural dimensions  of a TRAPs agreement. If minimum
standards are defined  broadly  to include  procedural transparency and due process-enhancing
disciplines,  there may be enforcement  and implementation-related  benefits  associated  with an
agreement. This possibility  is of great potential  significance  as implementation  of antitrust in some
developing  countries  may be resisted by powerful vested interests.
The need for multilateral  cooperation  is clearer with respect  to the other options, as unilateral
action is either unlikely or impossible. Of the various options, only the introduction  of greater
competition  disciplines  into existing  WTO agreements  and enhancing  the competition  advocacy  role of
the WTO appear to be unambiguously  beneficial. The other options have potential  downside  risks as
well as benefits. Minimum  substantive  competition  law standards could  clearly strengthen  the system,
"' Some  countries  have  given  antitrust  offices  a mandate  to scrutinize  govermnent  policy,  including  privatization
and  trade  policies,  for  their  impact  on  competiton.  A  problem  that  arises  for  any  agency  that  pursues  such  a mandate
is that  it may  confont  opposition  by interests  that  benefit  from  a particular  situation.  This  may  result  in attempts  to
constrain  the  agencies  mandate  directly,  or in efforts  to reduce  its budget.  A TRAPs  agreement  could  help  to sustain
the  work  of such  entities.
"9  Of  course,  this  will  extend  beyond  whatever  minimum  standards  are agreed  for horizotl  restraints.
15Table 2: Adoption  of Competition  Law in Developing  and Transition  Economies
Countries  with legislation  Memo: Countries  in
the process  of adopting
Country  Status  Country  Status  legislation
Africa  Cameroon
Algeria  1995  Mali  1992  Egypt
Cote d'lvoire  1991  South  Africa  1979  Jordan
Kenya  1988  Tunisia  1991  Gabon
Asia  Ghana
China  1993  Sri Lanka  1987  Morocco
India  1969; 1991  Taiwan  1991  Senegal
Pakistan  1970  Thailand  1979  Zambia
South  Korea  1980  Zimbabwe
Latin America  Indonesia
Argentina  1919; 1946;  Jamaica  1993  Malaysia
1980;  under  rev.
Brazil  1962; 1994  Mexico  1992  Philippines
Chile  1959;  1973  Peru  1991; 1994  Ecuador
Colombia  1959;  1992  Venezuela  1992  El Salvador
Transition  Economies  Paraguay
Belarus  1992  Latvia  1991  Albania
Bulgaria  1991  Moldova  1992  Armenia
Czech Republic  1991  Poland  1990  Azerbaijan
Estonia  1993  Romania  1991  Croatia
Georgia  1992;  under  rev.  Russia  1991  Macedonia
Hungary  1990  Slovakia  1994  Tajikistan
Kazakstan  1991; 1994  Ukraine  1992
Kyrgyzstan  1994  Uzbekistan  1992;  1994
Note: This list of countries  is not necessarily  comprehensive.
Source:  World  Bank,  Competition  and Strategy  Group.
16especially  if export cartels were to be prohibited. The toleration  of export cartels is inconsistent  with
the GATT ban on quantitative  export restrictions  and is a hole in the WTO. 20 The adoption  of
minimum  standards  may also help to diffuse  bilateral pressure and actions. By adopting antitrust
legislation  that satisfies  these standards,  a "target" country can argue that multilateral  dispute  settlement
procedures  should be invoked  rather than unilateral  actions. But if "too much" is sought in terms of
harmonization  of antitrust rules-especially beyond horizontal  restraints-or  enforcement,  the scope for
disputes and breakdown of cooperation  will increase;  to the detriment  of the system.
Similarly, expanding  the reach of nonviolation-based  dispute  settlement  has the potential  for
stressing  the system as WTO panels will be requested  to look at the effects of enforcement  or
nonenforcement  of national antitrust laws. This may strengthen  the system-by  reducing  the scope for
circumvention  of liberalization  commitments  and reducing  the uncertainty  regarding  market access
conditions-but it may also increase the pressure on the system. One reason is because of the implied
reliance on "judicial  activism" as opposed  to negotiated  disciplines  (Jackson, 1996). Another is that
panels  cannot impose  remedies that will change  the status quo.  This may induce greater use of
unilateral measures  that are "motivated"  by the finding  of the panel.  Finally, even the competition
advocacy  and "do nothing" options may be detrimental  to the trading system insofar as it encourages
the use of unilateral actions, discriminatory  solutions,  and so forth.
IV.  Feasibility  of Alternative  TRAPs  Agreements
Minimum Standards
At least 37 developing  countries  and economies  in transition  already have competition  legislation,  and
another  21 are in the process of revising  or adopting  such laws (Table 2).  Although the substantive
obligations  of these laws will differ, as will enforcement  standards, in most cases existing  statutes  will
20  Another  hole  is the  permissive  approach  towards  the  use  of export  taxes,  which  are not subject  to GATT  rules.
17tend  to be most stringent  with respect to horizontal  restraints. This suggests  achieving  agreement  on
minimum  standards with respect to such practices  may well be feasible. Greater difficulty  may be
experienced  concerning the procedural and administrative  disciplines,  as this may well constitute  more
of a threat for vested interests  that oppose greater competition.
It may also be difficult  for high income countries  to agree to eliminate  exemptions  for export
cartels, given that there may be a good economic  rationale  for them. 2' The need for multilateral
cooperation/negotiations  is clear. Any agreement  to ban export  cartels will have to be complemented  by
multilateral  disciplines  on government  policies that have an equivalent  effect. Although export
prohibitions  or quantitative  restrictions  are forbidden  under GATT  Art.XI, and export subsidies  on
manufactures  are prohibited for industrialized  countries, current WTO rules basically  give members the
freedom  to impose  tariffs  on exports.  They  also allow  for the formation  of export monopolies,  GATT
disciplines  (Art.XVII)  in this regard being limited  (Hoekman  and Mavroidis, 1994). This implies  that
members  would remain substantially  free to attempt  to shift the terms  of trade in their favor.  Efforts to
agree to multilateral  disciplines  on export cartels therefore will  have to be complemented  by analogous
tightening  of the rules regarding  the scope that exists for countries  to pursue "strategic" export policy.
Antitrust  and Unfair-Trade  Laws
Recent regional integration  agreements  suggest  agreements  to link antitrust to trade policy will not be
straightforward  to achieve. A commitment  by Central and Eastern  European  countries  to apply EU
competition  rules did not eliminate  the threat of contingent  protection  by the EU.  Antidumping  remains
applicable  to trade flows. The same is true in the EU's recent agreements  with the Mediterranean
countries  (Hoekrnan  and Djankov, 1996). Similarly,  the North American  Free Trade Agreement  also
maintains  antidumping  for internal  trade flows. Despite  the Canadian  government's great interest in
21  See  Auquier  and  Caves  (1979)  for a discussion  of the  exemption  from  competition  policy  of "rent  extracting"
behaviour  by home  country  firms  on export  markets,  as well  as the  optimal  policy  that  should  be pursued  by  the  home
country.
18disciplining  the use of antidumping  (with a stated preference for abolition)  negotiators  were unable to
agree to replace  antidumping  with antitrust enforcement. However, there are regional agreements
where the antidumping  option has been repealed in favor of competition  law enforcement. Examples
are the European  Economic  Area, the Australia-New  Zealand Closer Economic  Relations  Trade
Agreement  and most recently  the free trade agreement negotiated  between  Chile and Canada. In the
first two cases achieving  such agreement  took a long time, and was conditional  upon substantial
harmonization  of competition  and related  policies, including subsidies. 22
Whatever  the feasibility  of linking antitrust and trade policy in the regional  context, informal
proposals  to pursue such a linkage in the WTO have been confronted  with strong opposition. This
reflects the preferences of both the antitrust community  and the proponents  of "unfair  trade" laws in a
number  of high-income  countries. Discussion  of minimum  antitrust standards  is not rejected by either
group; what is opposed  is making  any agreement  on TRAPs "too" trade-related. Many antitrust
authorities  are hesitant about  becoming  drawn into trade policy, given the different objectives  in
practice of the two policy communities. While in principle  favoring  the introduction  of competition
principles into trade policy in general and "unfair trade" laws in particular,  there is concern  about
involving  antitrust offices  in the trade policy process. The fear is that this might  end up "corrupting"
antitrust enforcement  by shifting  the focus from protection of competition  to protecting  domestic  firms
from foreign competitors.
Supporters  of antidumping  and related "unfair  trade" instruments  are strongly opposed  to any
antitrust-related  involvement  in the enforcement  of such laws (Rosenthal  and Silliman,  1996; Stewart,
1996). For example,  they argue that antidumping  focuses  on what is recognized  by the WTO to be an
"unfair"  practice, that the appropriate  disciplines  and remedies  were recently  re-negotiated  with great
difficulty  in the Uruguay Round, and that "antidumping  policies as articulated  in the [GATT]
22 For  a discussion  of New  Zealand,  see  Ahdar  (1991).  More  generally,  see  Hoekman  and  Mavroidis  (1996)  and
Schone  (1996).
19Agreement on Article VI better promote rational  resource allocation  between countries  than national
competition  policies...  [and]  since there are no internationally  agreed rules on competition  policy, it is at
a minimum  premature  to discuss  a merger of one area into another" (Stewart, 1996,  p. 3).  If anything,
it is argued by Stewart, competition  policy has significant  lessons to learn from antidumping  law.
These propositions  suggest  that antitrust authorities  do have potential cause for concern. The apparent
confluence  of interest  between  defenders  of strong antitrust laws and the antidumping  lobby may create
a powerful coalition  against  any attempt  to ensure that a TRAPs agreement  introduces  antitrust
principles into the contingent  protection  process, especially  antidumping.
Making WTO rules more competition  friendly  may therefore be difficult  to attain, at least as far
as "unfair trade" laws such as antidumping  are concerned. This would  be particularly  detrimental  to
developing countries,  who have  much to gain from the introduction  of competition  principles in this
area.  Clearly a necessary  condition  for achieving  this will be significant  "concessions"  by such
countries. Whether enough concessions  can be made to convince (force) the antidumping  lobby to
accept competition  disciplines,  and whether  any resulting benefits  will be worth these concessions  are
open questions.
Nonviolation Dispute Settlement
How feasible  might it be to extend the reach of nonviolation? Clearly a necessary  condition is that
countries  have national  antitrust legislation. Many developing  nations  do not and will  therefore have to
adopt such provisions. However, as mentioned  earlier, a large number of countries  already have
competition  legislation  or are in the process of drafting  such laws. This is therefore  not a binding
constraint. The fact that GATT contracting  parties did not avail themselves  of this provision  in the
past, even though in principle  it offers the opportunity  to allege that nonenforcement  of antitrust or
measures  supporting  anticoinpetitive  practices  nullified  benefits, suggests  that extension  may not be that
easy to achieve. This is an approach  that leaves it to panelists  to determine  the rules of the game, and
20countries may fear that they tread on a slippery  slope (Blackhurst, 1994). Moreover, insofar as
agreement  is reached on minimum  antitrust  standards, the need for expanding  the reach of the
nonviolation  or nullification  option  may become less compelling  to negotiators. After all, it can be
argued that disputes will then revolve  around violations  of WTO commitments  to abide  by the
minimum  standards, and that expanding  nonviolation  is unnecessary.
The recent decision  by the US to bring a nonviolation  complaint  to the WTO alleging  that Fuji
has restricted Kodak's ability  to contest  the Japanese  market by engaging in anti-competitive  practices
suggests  that there may be a willingness  to explore expanding  the reach of this procedure. From a
systemic  perspective  it is beneficial  that actions  be brought to the WTO; from a national  perspective  it
is valuable  to be able to "deflect"  pressures  for action to the multilateral  level-allowing firms access  to
an objective  fact-finding  mechanism  may be enough in many instances  to "clear the air."  Moreover, if
it helps to prevent the use of unilateral  remedies, this also will be a valuable systemic  benefit.
A limited and clearly circumscribed  expansion  of the nonviolation  option  may prove
acceptable. One possibility  would be to require that a necessary  condition for invoking  nonviolation  is
prior rejection  of a case in writing  by the antitrust  authorities  of the importing  nation. In such cases,
panels might be limited  to a review of the application  of domestic  antitrust legislation;  a somewhat
more far-reaching  alternative  would be to allow them to determine  whether a decision  not to act by a
domestic antitrust agency implies  nullification  of negotiated  liberalization  commitments.
Competition  Advocacy
Granting  the WTO a competition  advocacy  mandate  requires acceptance  by members  to be subjected  to
such surveillance. Until the Trade Policy  Review  Mechanism  (TPRM)  was adopted in the late 1980s
there was little reason to be optimistic  regarding  the willingness  of members to do so.  In principle  the
rationale  for accepting  greater competition  advocacy is the same as that underlying  the TPRM:
although  a government  may not like to be subjected  to review as it can lead to pressure to change
21policies (both by domestic lobbies  and foreign  trading partners),  the quid pro quo is that all other WTO
members  are in the same situation. A potential  limitation  is that WTO members are likely to insist that
competition  advocacy remain trade-related,  i.e., that there is a "trade effects"  justification  for
investigating  particular practices or situations.
V.  Conclusions
A number of options for dealing with trade and competition  policy in the WTO have been investigated
in this paper: agree to minimum  standards  for national  antitrust laws; introduce  more competition
principles  into WTO trade policy rules; expand  the reach of the WTO provision on nullification  and
impairment  to policies that restrict competition;  grant the WTO a competition  advocacy  mandate; or do
nothing. From a developing  country perspective  all of these options have the potential  to be beneficial.
Indeed, the possible downside risk attached  to any of them appears limited.
The option  that in principle has the greatest  potential  for reducing welfare-harmonization of
substantive  competition  rules-will  in all likelihood  be limited  at most to horizontal  restrictions. As
economic  theory strongly suggests  that there are few if any efficiency  rationales  for permitting  such
practices,  there should not be a major concern  regarding  this option. To the extent that countries
currently tolerate such practices, banning them would improve  welfare. This in turn suggests  there is
little need for an international  agreement. Many developing  countries  either have, or are in the process
of adopting  competition  legislation. An agreement  on minimum  standards  may however be helpful  in
monitoring implementation  and enforcement  of competition  laws, in large part through a variety of
procedural disciplines  that aim at transparency  and "due process".  The rationale for multilateral
negotiations  to ban national  antitrust exemptions  for export  cartels is more obvious--the  status quo is
likely to be inefficient  from a world welfare viewpoint. Whether national  incentives  to ban such
exemptions  can be offset through negotiations  is an open question. Much may depend in this
connection  on what else is on the table and on the cross-issue  tradeoffs  that can be made.
22Developing  countries  would also benefit from a TRAPs agreement  that links competition  law to
antidumping  law, the goal ideally  being to replace the latter with the former. Introducing  antitrust-type
disciplines  into antidumping  would  be valuable from both a "market  access" and a welfare  perspective.
However, attempting  to achieve this will give rise to strong opposition  on the part of those who benefit
from antidumping. Such interests  are currently mostly  centered  in industrialized  countries  where
antidumping  is often a prominent instrument  of trade policy. The demand  for antidumping  is more
likely to increase  than decline  in the coming  decade.  The elimination  of MFA quotas and the
commitment  to reduce all tariffs to zero by 2010 in the APEC context, to name just two examples,  may
well result in a shift by affected import-competing  industries  towards  antidumping  and other forms of
contingent  protection. The increasing spread of antidumping  legislation  to developing  economies
expands  the set of interest groups that may oppose its abolition.
Expanding  the reach of nonviolation-based  dispute  settlement  would also be beneficial. This is
perhaps the most "hands-off"way  of allowing  antitrust-related  market access  problems  to be raised in
the WTO.  It has the advantage  of not requiring substantive  agreements  on common  disciplines. In
principle  all types of anti-competitive  practices tolerated  by governments  could  be contested, and much
might be learned about the significance  of the various anticompetitive  practices  that are alleged  to
constitute  market access  restrictions. While this may be seen as too much of a "slippery  slope" by
some negotiators, the openendedness  of this mechanism  can be limited. For example, agreement  could
be sought  to tie invocation  of WTO nonviolation  procedures  to decisions  by national  antitrust
authorities  not to investigate  or to act in a specific  case brought by foreign  firms.
Whatever  the eventual  outcome of a negotiation  on competition  policy, it must be kept in mind
that without  significant  progress in reducing barriers to trade and investment  a TRAPs agreement
cannot  do much to enhance  the contestability  of markets. Trade and investment  liberalization  should
therefore  be continued  to be pursued on a priority basis. Of particular  importance  in this connection  is
liberalization  of services. Commitments  made by WTO members  on services  are quite limited, with
23developing  countries in particular fully  opening  up only a very small set of service activities  to foreign
competition. Granting  the WTO secretariat  a greater competition  advocacy  role could  therefore prove
to be quite useful in maintaining  and expanding  the scope of liberalization  efforts.
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